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Foreword
This paper is based on work carried out on behalf of the Population Division of the 
United Nations, as part of the preparations for the 1994 International Conference on 
Population and Development.
Stephen Castles
Abstract
The incorporation of migrants into society has become an important public policy 
issue in most highly-developed countries. The 'traditional countries of immigration' 
have treated migrants as permanent settlers, permitting family reunion and acquisition 
of citizenship. Canada and Australia have introduced multicultural policies which 
recognise cultural rights and seek to remove barriers to full participation in society. 
The USA has mainly left integration to market forces, but has brought in equal 
opportunities and anti-racist measures. The European 'labour-importing countries' 
originally saw most migrants as temporary workers. Policies have changed in 
response to family reunion and settlement. Sweden has a multicultural policy, while 
the Dutch minorities policy is fairly similar. France and Britain attempt to integrate 
settlers into citizenship, and have social policies to overcome migrant disadvantage 
and reduce conflict. Germany and Switzerland have clung to the myth of 
temporariness, refusing to grant citizenship to most settlers, yet have had to introduce 
some social policy measures.
Labour migration almost always leads to settlement and ethnic group formation. It has 
become clear that old ideas of individual assimilation into homogeneous societies are 
mistaken. Ethnic groups are incorporated into social structures marked by 
differentiation on the basis of class, gender and other factors. The character of the 
ethnic groups depends to a large extent on the immigration and social policies of the 
receiving country. For successful incorporation, ethnic groups need associations and 
social networks, as well as their own languages and cultures. Multicultural models 
appear to offer the best chance of integration, while reducing social conflict and 
racism. Such models could be adapted to fit the needs of most Western European 
countries, and could offer useful perspectives for new countries of immigration.
I. Introduction
Most highly-developed countries have experienced large-scale immigration from less- 
developed areas since 1945. Whatever the original intentions of the governments and 
of the migrants concerned, many migrants have become long-term or permanent 
settlers. The incorporation of migrants into the societies of the receiving countries 
has therefore become an important issue of public policy, with significant effects on 
the labour market, housing, education and social welfare, as well as on national 
identity and political institutions. This paper will discuss concepts of incorporation 
and ethnic group formation. It will go on to examine experiences and policies in both 
'traditional countries of immigration' and in the Western European countries which 
have recruited foreign labour. This leads on to cross-national sectoral comparisons, 
designed to show both the common factors and the differences in the process of 
incorporation in the various countries. Finally the relative success of differing 
approaches will be discussed. Much of the analysis is based on Castles and Miller 
(1993).
II. The concept of migrant incorporation
Integration is widely used as a general term to refer to the process by which 
immigrants become members of a receiving society. It would be more correct to 
speak of various forms of migrant incorporation, of which integration is just one. An 
assessment of incorporation cannot restrict itself to government policies, but must 
look at a wide range of social processes, such as inclusion in social, economic and 
political structures; the degree and nature of migrant participation in the institutions 
of the society; and the emergence of various forms of inequality. It is important to 
examine what social conditions facilitate or hinder full incorporation of migrants into 
the social fabric (compare Breton et al. 1990: 3). The outcome of the process may not 
be absorption of immigrants but formation of ethnic groups (see Rex and Mason, 
1986). In principle, it is possible to differentiate between four possible approaches to 
migrant incorporation, each of which implies different outcomes. These are 
commonly referred to as assimilation, integration, exclusion and multiculturalism. As 
will be discussed below, the two base forms may lead to the formation of distinct 
ethnic groups.
Assimilation
Assimilation refers to the incorporation of migrants into society through a one-sided 
process of adaptation, in which they are expected to give up their distinctive
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linguistic, cultural or social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the 
majority population. Assimilation is generally seen as a process of individual 
adaptation to prevailing values, norms and behavioural forms. A theory of migrant 
assimilation was first provided by the 'Chicago School' of sociology in the 1920s. It 
is summed up in Park’s concept of the ‘race relations cycle', in which groups pass 
through the stages of contact, conflict, accommodation and assimilation (Park, 1950: 
82-4). Successful completion of this process can lead to a restoration of the overall 
cohesiveness of society. The 'commonsense' version is that immigrants must speak 
the majority language and learn to behave like the majority if they want to be 
accepted. Assimilation presupposes the willingness and ability of immigrants to 
discard distinct traits and the willingness of the dominant group to accept new 
members. It also assumes a high degree of cultural homogeneity and consensus on 
values and norms among the population of the receiving society.
Assimilation was the prevailing approach to immigrant incorporation in the USA in 
the early part of this century, at a time of massive immigration and urbanisation. It 
was also the conventional wisdom in several countries which experienced mass 
immigration after 1945, including Britain, Canada and Australia. Assimilation 
implies that the role of the state is to create conditions favourable to individual 
adaptation, but not to maintenance of distinct ethnic groups. This usually means a 
policy of 'benign neglect', in which government does not provide special services for 
immigrants (except perhaps initial settlement services and language courses). 
Insistence on use of the dominant language and attendance at normal schools for 
migrant children is seen as a way of transferring the majority culture and values. 
Assimilation is inherent in current 'human capital' approaches to immigration, which 
argue that the state should simply leave matters to market mechanisms, which will 
select the most suitable immigrants and encourage successful adaptation (compare 
Borjas, 1990).
Integration
Integration refers to a process of mutual accommodation between immigrants and the 
majority population. The concept implies that immigrant groups will cease to be 
distinctive in culture and behaviour over time, but sees the adaptation as a two-way 
process in which minority and majority groups learn from each other and take on 
aspects of each other’s culture. Integrationist approaches developed in the 1960s in 
response to several factors. Firstly, it became evident that recent immigrants were not 
simply becoming assimilated as individuals, but were tending to form social, cultural 
and political associations, and to maintain the use of their mother tongues. Secondly,
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it became clear that immigrants were becoming concentrated into particular 
occupations and residential areas, so that ethnic background and class were linked. 
Thirdly, as immigrants formed groups and associations, they became increasingly 
critical of the denial of legitimacy to their cultures and languages.
As a result, official policies shifted. Integration became a tenet of official policy in 
Australia (Collins, 1991: 231) and Canada (Fleras and Elliott, 1992: 61-2). It also 
became the guiding principle for educational policy in Britain. In the USA, the shift 
was rather towards changing the role of the state, to remove barriers to individual 
participation through equal opportunities and affirmative action legislation. The 
legitimacy of ethnic organisations and the inevitability of some degree of cultural and 
linguistic maintenance in the first and second generations was accepted. Ethnic group 
solidarity came to be seen as an instrument of successful settlement and adaptation, 
rather than a sign of maladaptation to the receiving society.
Exclusion
Exclusion refers to a situation in which immigrants are incorporated into certain areas 
of society (above all, the labour market) but denied access to others (such as welfare 
systems, citizenship and political participation). Exclusion may take place through 
legal mechanisms (such as refusal of naturalisation and sharp distinctions between the 
rights of citizens and non-citizens) or through informal practices (racism and 
discrimination). Immigrants become rightless ethnic minorities, who are part of 
society but are excluded from the state and nation. Since such ethnic minorities are 
usually socio-economically disadvantaged, this situation implies a strong and 
continuing link between class and ethnic background. Former 'guestworker' 
recruiting countries in Western Europe have tended towards exclusionary models.
Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism refers to the development of immigrant populations into ethnic 
communities which remain distinguishable from the majority population with regard 
to language, culture, social behaviour and autonomous associations over a long period 
(usually several generations). It differs from exclusion in that immigrants are granted 
more or less equal rights in most spheres of society, without being expected to give 
up their diversity, although usually with an expectation of conformity to certain key 
values. Multiculturalism implies the willingness of the majority group to accept and 
even welcome cultural difference, and to change social behaviour and institutional 
structures accordingly. General policies of multiculturalism exist in Canada,
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Australia and Sweden, while multicultural policies exist in specific sectors such as 
education or welfare in Britain and the Netherlands.
Ethnic group formation
Although exclusion and multiculturalism appear as opposites, they are facets of a 
single process: that of ethnic group formation. A number of structural factors in 
highly-developed countries cause migrants to take on specific (and often inferior) 
social positions. At the same time, group solidarity in the face of a new (and 
sometimes hostile) environment gives a subjective dimension to group formation. 
Whether the ethnic group takes the form of an excluded minority or of an accepted 
community depends largely on the attitudes of the majority population and the actions 
of the state. Ethnic group position is a product of both 'other-definition', and of 'self­
definition'. Other-definition means ascription of undesirable characteristics and 
assignment to inferior social positions by dominant groups. Self-definition refers to 
the consciousness of group members of belonging together on the basis of shared 
cultural and social characteristics. The relative strength of other and self-definition 
can vary. Some minorities are mainly constituted on the basis of cultural and 
historical consciousness (or ethnicity) among their members. Others are mainly 
constructed through processes of exclusion (or racism) by the majority.
Ethnicity may be understood as a sense of group belonging, based on ideas of 
common origins, history, culture, experience and values (Fishman, 1985: 4; Smith, 
1986: 27). Ethnicity is sometimes seen as primordial, that is as pre-social, almost 
instinctual, something one is bom into (Geertz, 1963). However, other scholars speak 
of situational ethnicity: members of a group decide to 'invoke' ethnicity, as a criterion 
for self-identification. The markers chosen for the ethnic boundaries are variable, 
generally emphasising cultural characteristics, such as language, history, customs and 
religion, but sometimes including 'phenotype' or physical characteristics (popularly 
referred to as 'race') (Wallman, 1986). Similarly, studies of the 'ethnic revival' by the 
US sociologists Glazer and Moynihan (1975) and Bell (1975) emphasise the 
instrumental role of ethnic identification, which is used to strengthen group solidarity 
in order to struggle more effectively for market advantages, or for allocation of 
resources by the state.
Whether ethnicity is 'primordial', 'situational' or 'instrumental' need not concern us 
here. The point is that ethnicity leads to identification with a specific group, but its 
visible markers-phenotype, language, culture, customs, religion, behaviour-may also 
be used as criteria for exclusion by other groups. Becoming an ethnic minority is not
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an automatic result of immigration, but rather the consequence of specific 
mechanisms of marginalisation, which affect different groups in different ways. 
Exclusionary practices against ethnic minorities are known as racism, which may be 
defined as:
The process whereby social groups categorise other groups as different or 
inferior, on the basis of phenotypical or cultural markers. This process involves 
the use of economic, social or political power, and generally has the purpose of 
legitimating exploitation or exclusion of the group so defined.
Racism means making (and acting upon) predictions about people's character, 
abilities or behaviour on the basis of socially constructed markers of difference. The 
power of the dominant group is sustained by developing structures (such as laws and 
administrative practices) that exclude or discriminate against the dominated group. 
This is referred to as institutional or structural racism. Racist attitudes and 
discriminatory behaviour on the part of members of the dominant group are referred 
to as informal racism. In many cases, supposed biological differences are not the 
only markers for exclusion: culture, religion or language are also used.
The historical explanation for racism lies in traditions, ideologies and cultural 
practices, which have developed through ethnic conflicts associated with nation- 
building, as well as through colonial expansion (compare Miles, 1989). The reasons 
for recent increases in racism in highly-developed countries must be sought in 
fundamental economic and social changes. Since the early 1970s, world economic 
restructuring and increasing international cultural interchange have been experienced 
by some social groups as a direct threat to their livelihood, life-style and national 
identity. Since these changes have coincided with the implantation of new ethnic 
minorities the tendency has been to perceive the newcomers as the cause of the 
threatening changes.
Ethnic group formation is obviously of great importance. If migrant settlement 
generally leads to formation of ethnic groups, then notions of fairly rapid assimilation 
or integration are mistaken. Immigration countries have to face up to the long-term 
prospect of pluralist societies. The crucial question then is whether structural factors 
and policies lead to excluded ethnic minorities, or to accepted ethnic communities. 
Ethnic minorities are likely to lead a disadvantaged and conflictual life on the 
margins of societies which seek to maintain the myth of cultural homogeneity. Ethnic 
communities, on the other hand, can be integral parts of societies which are
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consciously multicultural. Obviously this dichotomy refers to ideal types, while most 
real societies come somewhere in-between, as will be shown below.
It is also vital to realise that migrants do not enter consensual societies with 
homogeneous cultures and universally accepted values. Rather they are incorporated 
into social structures marked by differentiation on lines of class, gender, position in 
the life-cycle, etc. Nor are the migrant or ethnic groups themselves homogeneous: 
they are structured according to similar criteria. Thus the study of integration means 
looking at the way complex social groups interact with each other, form new social 
networks and modify their cultures and forms of action.
III. Policy and experience in traditional countries of immigration
Since 1945, the countries with the largest permanent settler inflows have been the 
USA, Canada and Australia. Other traditional immigration countries, such as 
Argentina, Brazil and New Zealand, will not be discussed here for reasons of space. 
The USA, Canada and Australia have certain common features. They are white 
settler societies in which mainly British colonists destroyed or dispossessed 
aboriginal populations. Mass immigration has been part of the strategy for nation- 
building and industrialisation. All three have regarded most entrants as permanent 
settlers and have allowed family reunion. Immigrants have readily been granted 
citizenship, while their children have been bom as citizens. All three countries 
preferred British immigrants, but admitted other Europeans too. Asians and other 
non-Europeans were excluded until the 1960s, but now form a large proportion of 
new entrants.
The USA
US society is a complex ethnic mosaic deriving from five centuries of immigration 
(Feagin, 1989). Until 1965, most migrants came from Europe. The 1965 
Immigration Act removed national quotas, and opened the door for worldwide 
entries, mainly through the family reunion categories. New settlers have come 
mainly from Latin America and Asia. The main Latin American source country is 
Mexico, with many migrants coming as undocumented agricultural workers. The 
main Asian countries of origin are the Philippines, China, South Korea, Vietnam and 
India. Current policy is for increased intakes, with a larger share of economic 
migrants. The 1990 Census enumerated a total population of 249 million, of whom
80 per cent were white, 12 per cent black, 1 per cent American Indian, 3 per cent 
Asian or Pacific Islanders and 4 per cent of other race. Hispanics (who can be of any
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race) made up 9 per cent of the total population (Bureau of the Census, 1991). In 
1980 there were 14 million foreign-born people in the USA (6 per cent of the total 
population) (Briggs, 1984: 77). At the time of writing, the foreign-born figure for 
1990 is not available, but there has certainly been a large increase, since immigration 
in the 1980s averaged over 600,000 per year.
Before 1945, most Europeans and Afro-Americans were incorporated into low-skilled 
industrial jobs, which led to labour market disadvantage and residential segregation. 
In the long run, many 'white ethnics' have been able to achieve upward mobility, 
while Afro-Americans have become increasingly ghettoised. Distinctions between 
blacks and whites in income, unemployment rates, social conditions and education 
are still extreme. Members of some recent immigrant groups, especially from Asia, 
have high educational and occupational levels, while most Latin Americans lack 
education and are concentrated in unskilled categories (Portes and Rumbaut, 1990).
Integration of immigrants into economy and society has been largely left to market 
forces. The egalitarian character of US society has been seen as providing the best 
possible chances for immigrant groups to become part of the 'American dream'. 
Nonetheless, government has played a role by making it easy to obtain US 
citizenship, and through using compulsory education as a way of transmitting the 
English language and American values. Legislation following the Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1950s and 1960s led to measures to prevent discrimination and 
secure equal opportunities for ethnic minorities. However, commitment to equal 
opportunities and anti-poverty measures declined during the Reagan-Bush era, 
leading to increased community tension and racism.
Canada
The 1986 Census counted 3.9 million overseas-born people, of whom 2.4 million 
were from Europe, 623,000 from American countries and 693,000 from Asia. In 
recent years Asians have been the largest group of entrants, followed by Latin 
Americans (including Caribbeans). The five-year immigration plan announced in 
1990 lays down entry levels of 250,000 per year from 1992-95 (Immigration Canada, 
1991). According to 1986 data on the 'ethnocultural origins' of Canada's 25 million 
people, 34 per cent were of British origin, 24 per cent of French origin, 5 per cent 
British-French combined and 38 per cent of ‘other’ (mainly immigrant) origin. In 
1986 about 6 per cent of the total population were regarded as belonging to ‘visible 
minorities’ (i.e. non-Europeans), of whom 2 per cent were Native Peoples, 1 per cent 
South Asian, and 1 per cent black.
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After 1945 a policy of assimilation (or 'Anglo-conformity') was pursued towards non- 
British settlers (mainly Southern Europeans). In the 1960s, there was a move towards 
integrationist approaches for both immigrants and aboriginal peoples. In 1971, 
multiculturalism was proclaimed as Canada’s official policy and a Minister of State 
for Multiculturalism was appointed. In 1988, Canada became the first country in the 
world to pass a Multiculturalism Act. It proclaimed multiculturalism as a central 
feature of Canadian society, and laid down principles for cultural and language 
preservation, reducing discrimination and enhancing intercultural awareness and 
understanding.
Multiculturalism was seen as a central strategy for all government policies which 
might affect immigrants. This involved recognition of the need for institutional 
change in areas such as law enforcement, legal services, health services and 
education. Anti-racism and equal opportunities measures were integral parts of the 
multiculturalism policy, as were measures to improve the situation of immigrant and 
‘visible minority’ women (Fleras and Elliott, 1992: 76-7). The Employment Equity 
Act of 1986 required all federally regulated employers to assess and report on the 
composition of their workforce in order to correct disadvantages faced by women, 
visible minorities, native people and the disabled. Despite such policies, community 
relations appeared to be deteriorating in the 1980s. Among the visible signs of 
conflict were discrimination against Native Canadians, and racial assaults against 
blacks and Asians. The unwillingness of the authorities to respond to racist attacks 
has been a major cause of politicisation and resistance among visible minorities. 
Police treatment of minorities became a major issue (Stasiulis, 1988).
Australia
In 1947, the Australian Government started a large-scale immigration program, to 
increase the population and stimulate industrial development. The Government 
wanted British migrants, but not enough came. In the late 1940s, most migrants came 
from Eastern and Northwestern Europe; in the 1950s and 1960s, Southern Europeans 
predominated; while in the 1970s and 1980s, the collapse of the White Australia 
Policy opened the way for migrants from Asia, the Middle East and Latin America 
(Collins, 1991). Australia moved from being an almost mono-cultural country to one 
of great diversity. By 1991, 23 per cent of the population were immigrants, and 
another 20 per cent were Australian-born with one or both parents immigrants. Two 
per cent of the population were Aborigines or Torres Strait Islanders. In 1991 there 
were 3.9 million overseas-born people, of whom 2.4 million came from Europe (1.2 
million of these from the UK), 898,000 from Asia, 288,000 from New Zealand,
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186,000 from Africa and 158,000 from the Americas (OECD SOPEMI, 1992, Table 
26).
Australia wanted permanent settlers: family re-union and naturalisation were 
encouraged. The initial five-year waiting period for naturalisation was reduced to 
three and then two years. Children bom to legal immigrants in Australia are 
automatically citizens. The Australian model for managing diversity has had two 
main stages. At first there was a policy of assimilationism, based on the doctrine that 
immigrants could be culturally and socially absorbed, and become indistinguishable 
from Anglo-Australians. Migrants were treated as 'New Australians', who were to 
live and work with Anglo-Australians and rapidly become citizens. There was no 
special educational provision for migrant children. Cultural pluralism and the 
formation of 'ethnic ghettoes' was to be avoided at all costs. But by the 1960s it 
became clear that assimilationism was not working due to processes of labour market 
segmentation, residential segregation and community formation. Moreover, political 
parties were beginning to discover the political potential of the 'ethnic vote'.
The result was a shift to multiculturalism in the 1970s. This is based on the idea that 
ethnic communities, which maintain their own languages and cultures are legitimate 
and consistent with Australian citizenship, as long as respect for basic values and 
democratic institutions is safeguarded. Multiculturalism also means recognition of 
the need for special laws, institutions and social policies to overcome barriers to full 
participation in society (Castles et al. 1990; Castles, 1992). Multicultural policies are 
implemented by a range of special agencies. The Office of Multicultural Affairs in 
the Prime Minister's Department is responsible for promoting multiculturalism in 
Federal Government policies. There are similar bodies at the state government level. 
Health, education and other departments have multicultural units to ensure that 
services are appropriate to the needs of the various ethnic groups. The government 
provides services for migrants such as reception centres, help in finding work, 
language courses, educational support for children, and translating and interpreting 
services. Ethnic organisations participate in planning of services through consultative 
bodies.
IV. Policy and experience in the former labour importing countries 
of Western Europe
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Table 1: Foreign resident population in selected European countries (thousands)
Country 1980 1985 1990
per cent of total 
population 1990
Austria 283 272 413 5.3
Belgium 845 905 9.1
Denmark 102 117 161 3.1
France 3,714* .. 3,608 6.4
Germany 4,453 4,379 5,242 8.2
Italy 299 423 781 1.4
Luxembourg 94 98 27.5**
Netherlands 521 553 692 4.6
Norway 83 102 143 3.4
Sweden 422 389 484 5.6
Switzerland 893 940 1,100 16.3
United Kingdom „ 1.731 1,875 3.3
Notes: *Figure for 1982. **Figure for 1989.
These figures are for foreign population. They therefore exclude naturalised immigrants (particularly 
important for France, the United Kingdom and Sweden). They also exclude immigrants from colonies 
or former colonies with the citizenship of the immigration country (particularly important for France, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).
Source: OECD SOPEMI, 1992: 131.
The main period of migration to Western Europe was from the late 1950s to the early 
1970s. There were two main types of migration: movement of foreign workers from 
the European periphery, and movement of 'colonial workers' to the former colonising 
country. Both movements started off as labour migration. Both led to family reunion 
and permanent settlement, but the legal arrangements for entry and integration were 
very different. As Table 1 shows, foreign populations started to grow again in the 
late 1980s, partly through renewed entries of workers, but above all through entries of 
asylum seekers. Foreign residents make up a significant percentage of the population 
in most Western European countries. Growth has been partly through immigration 
and partly through births to immigrant parents.
The United Kingdom
In 1990 there were 1.9 million foreign citizens in the UK (3.3 per cent of the total 
population). The largest single group were the 638,000 Irish, followed by Indians
(155,000), US citizens (102,000) and Italians (75,000) (OECD SOPEMI, 1992). The
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ethnic minority population, most of whom are British citizens of Afro-Caribbean and 
Asian origin, totals 2.7 million (4.7 per cent of the population). Most have been bom 
in Britain-they are second or third generation descendants of immigrants who came 
from the 1950s to the 1970s. About 1.4 million have their origins in the Indian sub­
continent (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) and 455,000 in the Caribbean. The 
overall population of immigrant origin may be estimated at 4.5 million or about 8 per 
cent of the total population.
Most Commonwealth immigrants entered as British subjects, who enjoyed all rights 
once admitted. This situation was ended by the 1971 Immigration Act and the 1981 
British Nationality Act, which put new Commonwealth immigrants on a par with 
foreigners. Irish settlers enjoy virtually all rights, including the right to vote. It is 
relatively easy for foreigners to obtain citizenship after 5 years of legal residence in 
Britain. Since 1965, a series of Race Relations Acts has been passed, outlawing 
discrimination in public places, in employment and housing. A Commission for 
Racial Equality (CRE) was set up to enforce anti-discrimination laws and promote 
good community relations (Banton, 1985).
Labour market segmentation developed in the 1950s and 1960s, with Asians and 
Afro-Caribbeans concentrated in the least desirable jobs. Today, black workers still 
have low average socio-economic status and high unemployment. Ethnic minorities 
are heavily concentrated in the most run down areas of the inner cities. In the 1960s, 
policies towards black immigrants oscillated between calls for cultural assimilation 
and the demand for repatriation. The school was seen as an important instrument of 
assimilation for the second generation. In the 1970s there was a move towards 
integration policies with emphasis on adaptation as a long-term group process, and 
special measures to overcome the disadvantages of migrant children at school. Social 
policies were changed to provide special funding for local government areas with 
high migrant populations. By the 1980s, multicultural education became official 
policy in many areas, with recognition of ethnic group cultures in teaching and 
curriculum. Social policy initiatives were designed to draw ethnic organisations into 
youth and community work. However, some black organisations argued that such 
measures were designed to coopt leaderships and stifle protest. They called instead 
for anti-racist policies.
Organised racist groups such as the National Front grew rapidly in the 1970s and 
1980s. Their electoral success was limited, but they recruited members of violent 
youth sub-cultures, such as skinheads. Racist violence became a major problem. A
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Home Office survey in 1981 found that the rate of attacks on Asians was 50 times 
that for white people, and the rate for blacks was 36 that for white people (Home 
Office, 1989). Black youth discontent exploded into riots in inner-city areas in 1980-
81 and again in 1985-86 (Beynon, 1986). Growing conflicts in inner-city areas led to 
government measures to combat youth unemployment, make education more 
accessible to minorities, improve the conditions in urban areas and to change police 
practices. Task forces were set up for disadvantaged areas; spending under the Urban 
Program was substantially increased, and a large scale Youth Training Scheme was 
introduced (Layton-Henry, 1986; Solomos, 1989).
France
After 1945 the French Government recruited migrant workers in Southern Europe. 
There were also movements from the colonies or former colonies in North Africa and, 
to a lesser extent, West Africa and the Caribbean. Labour recruitment was stopped in 
1974, but family entries and other forms of immigration continued. The 3.6 million 
foreign residents made up 6.4 per cent of France's total population in 1990. The main 
groups were Portuguese (646,000), Algerians (620,000), Moroccans (585,000) 
Italians (254,000) Spaniards (216,000), Tunisians (208,000) and Turks (202,000) 
(OECD SOPEMI, 1992: Table 9). In addition there are over 1 million immigrants 
who have become French citizens, and up to half a million French citizens of African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Island origin from 'Overseas Departments and Territories'.
European community citizens enjoy all basic rights, except the right to vote. 
Immigrants from Yugoslavia, Poland and other non-EC European countries lack the 
privileges of EC citizens, and many have an irregular legal situation. People of non- 
European birth or parentage, whether French citizens or not, constitute the ethnic 
minorities. These include Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccans, young Franco- 
Algerians, black Africans, Turks and settlers from the Overseas Departments and 
Territories. Citizenship is fairly easy to obtain for immigrants, while children bom to 
foreign residents in France can choose to become citizens at the age of 18. The 1972 
Law Against Racism, prohibited racial incitement and discrimination in public places 
and employment. There is no special body to enforce the law and the number of 
prosecutions is small (Costa-Lascoux, 1989). There is little support for multicultural 
policies in France. The prevailing view is that immigrants are best integrated through 
citizenship, which in turn presupposes a certain degree of cultural assimilation. 
Special policies for ethnic groups and recognition of their leaderships are seen as 
potential hindrances to integration (Weil, 1991).
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The bidonvilles (shanty-towns) which developed around French cities in the 1960s 
have disappeared, but there is still residential concentration in inner-city areas and in 
the grandes ensembles-the public housing areas on the periphery of the cities. The 
work situation of ethnic minorities is marked by low status, insecure jobs and high 
unemployment rates (Verbunt, 1985). In the late 1980s, growing racism and serious 
social problems led to a series of special programs to improve housing and education 
and combat youth unemployment.
The position of ethnic minorities in French society has become highly politicised. 
Immigrants have taken an active role in major strikes, and demanded civil, political 
and cultural rights. The second generation (known as beurs) and the Muslim 
organisations are emerging political forces (de Wenden, 1987). Youth discontent 
with unemployment and police practices led to riots in Lyon, Paris and other cities in 
the 1980s. Immigration is a central issue in party and electoral politics. The extreme- 
right Front National mobilises on issues of immigration and cultural difference. By 
the early 1990s it had become a major political force (Lapeyronnie et al. 1990).
Germany
The foreign resident population of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has 
grown from 4.5 million in 1980 to 5.2 million in 1990 (figures refer to the area of 
Western Germany only). The main groups in 1990 were Turks (1.7 million), 
Yugoslavs (652,000), Italians (548,000), Greeks (315,000) and Poles (241,000) 
(OECD SOPEMI, 1992: Table 10). The FRG has experienced several migratory 
movements, including large inflows of people of German ethnic background from 
Eastern Europe after the Second World War and again since 1989. Here we will 
confine ourselves to discussing foreign immigration. This started after 1955, when 
the government signed labour recruitment agreements with Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. The migrants were regarded as 
'guestworkers' who would work in Germany for a few years and then go home. They 
were not expected to settle and family reunion was discouraged (Castles and Kosack, 
1973: 39-43).
Migrants became manual workers in construction or in factories. Most were men, but 
there was a substantial female minority. Employers in the textile and clothing, 
electrical assembly and food processing branches often preferred female labour. In 
the early 1970s Turkish workers became the largest single migrant group. The 
German Government stopped labour recruitment in 1973, hoping that surplus workers 
would leave. In fact, many foreign workers stayed, and family reunion continued.
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By the late 1970s it was clear that permanent settlement was taking place. However, 
the Federal Government continued to assert that Germany 'is not a country of 
immigration'. Since the mid-1980s there has been a growth of temporary labour 
migration (mostly short-term) from Poland. These workers now play a major role in 
building, domestic work and other informal sector activities in Germany-a 
resumption of historical patterns going back to the 19th century.
Asylum seeker inflows increased dramatically in the late 1980s reaching 100,000 in 
1986, 193,000 in 1990 and 256,000 in 1991 (OECD SOPEMI, 1992: 132). Many of 
the asylum-seekers come from Africa and Asia, but the main growth since 1989 has 
been in East-West movements. Anybody who arrives in the FRG and claims to be an 
asylum seeker is permitted to stay pending an official decision on refugee status, 
which can take several years. In 1990, 96 per cent of applications were rejected. 
However, legal and practical difficulties precludes deportation of most rejected 
applicants, and many stay on. Most Eastern European asylum-seekers belong to 
ethnic minorities, including Jews and Gypsies (OECD SOPEMI, 1991: 8-18). In 
1992 there was an upsurge in asylum-seeker entries from war-zones of the former 
Yugoslavia. Many Yugoslav asylum-seekers are Gypsies, as are the majority of those 
from Romania. This ethnic group became the main target of racist attacks in mid-
1992. Much of the violence was organised by extreme-right groups, and was 
concentrated in the area of the former German Democratic Republic.
The myth of temporary residence still shapes the legal status of foreigners, except 
those from EC countries, who largely enjoy social and economic parity with German 
citizens. Non-EC residents are excluded from a whole range of rights and services, 
and denied political participation and representation. There are considerable barriers 
to obtaining citizenship. By the mid-1980s over 3 million foreigners in the FRG 
fulfilled the 10 year residence qualification, but only about 14,000 per year actually 
obtained citizenship (Funcke, 1991). Nor do children bom in Germany to foreign 
parents have any automatic right to citizenship, although the Foreigners Law of 1990 
has made it somewhat easier. Even second generation immigrants can, under certain 
circumstances (conviction for criminal offences or long-term unemployment), be 
deported.
There is a constant public debate on 'foreigners policy’, with three basic positions. 
Firstly, the right (both the extreme right and much of the ruling Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU)) call for a continuation of exclusionary policies, including restriction of 
family entry, limitation of rights and widespread use of deportation powers. The
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second position (held by most members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and 
some parts of the CDU) recognises that settlement is irreversible, and calls for 
policies of assimilation or integration. The third position holds that assimilation is no 
longer possible in view of the emergence of ethnic communities, and that 
multicultural models are the only solution. This view is held in the Green Party, 
some parts of the SPD, the churches and the trade unions (Castles, 1985; Leggewie, 
1990). The German model is still essentially exclusionary, but there is growing 
realisation that a democratic society cannot permanently deny citizenship and 
participation to a large section of the population. On the other hand, the growth of the 
racist extreme right hampers moves towards improving the position of migrants.
Sweden
Until 1945 Sweden was a fairly homogeneous country, with only a small Lapp 
minority (about 10,000 people today). After 1945, labour migration was encouraged. 
Foreign worker recruitment was stopped in 1972, but family reunion and refugee 
entries continued. In 1990, there were 484,000 foreign residents who made up 5.6 per 
cent of the total population. Other Scandinavian countries (particularly Finnland) 
provided 185,000 of them. The largest non-Scandinavian groups were Yugoslavs
(41,000), Iranians (39,000), Turks (26,000) and Chileans (20,000). Many immigrants 
have become Swedish citizens. In 1986, the total population of immigrant 
background was calculated to be 920,014-about 11 per cent of the total population. 
Of these 250,138 had been bom in Sweden (Lithmann, 1987).
Migrant workers are over-represented in manufacturing and in lower-skilled services 
occupations. They are under-represented in agriculture, health care and social work, 
administrative and clerical work, and commerce. Migrants have unemployment rates 
about twice as high as for Swedes. Most migrants settle in the cities, and people of 
the same nationality cluster in certain neighbourhoods, allowing linguistic and 
cultural maintenance.
Sweden is the only European country with a declared policy of multiculturalism, first 
introduced in 1975. The policy emphasises the need for measures to give immigrants 
the same living standards as Swedes, as well as the right of immigrants to choose 
between retaining their own cultural identities or assuming Swedish cultural identity. 
Sweden has a comprehensive set of social policies designed to integrate migrants into 
society. Since 1975, foreign residents have had the right to vote and stand for 
election in local and regional elections. The waiting period for naturalisation is two 
years for Scandinavians and five years for everybody else, while children bom to
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foreign resident parents can obtain Swedish citizenship upon application. In 1986 an 
Act Against Ethnic Discrimination came into force. Immigrants have the right to 400 
hours of Swedish instruction with financial assistance. Children of immigrants can 
receive pre-school and school instruction in their own language, within the normal 
curriculum. Other measures include translator and interpreter services, information 
services, grants to immigrant organisations, and special consultative bodies (Hammar, 
1985).
However, multiculturalism has been under attack in recent years. The increase in 
asylum-seeker entry in the late 1980s led to strains in housing and other areas (Alund 
and Schierup, 1991). The extreme-right Sverigepartiet (SP-the Sweden Party) started 
anti-immigrant campaigns in 1986. In the late 1980s there was an increase in racist 
violence, including arson and bomb attacks on refugee centres. In December 1989, 
the government decided that asylum should henceforth be granted only to applicants 
meeting the requirements of the UN Refugee Convention (Larsson, 1991).
Other European countries
This is only a brief outline of the situation in other Western European countries. In 
general terms it may be said that Belgium and Switzerland have policies rather 
similar to that of Germany. Migrants are not regarded as permanent settlers, lack 
rights and find it very difficult to become citizens. However, permanent settlement is 
inescapable, as shown by the fact that most foreign residents in Switzerland hold 
long-term 'establishment permits'. In Belgium, as in France and Germany, Muslim 
groups tend to be the most isolated from mainstream society. There have been a 
series of youth disturbances in major cities in recent years. The Netherlands has 
many similarities with the Swedish model. The Minorities Policy, introduced in 
1983, accepted the need for specific social policies to integrate minorities, and 
recognised that is was necessary to deal not just with individuals but with ethnic 
groups. 'Integration with preservation of cultural identity' became the slogan. Anti- 
discrimination legislation and local voting rights for foreign residents were 
introduced. However, the growth of socio-economic disadvantage among migrants 
has led to a re-examination of policies. The 1991 government Action Program on 
Minorities Policy pays little attention to the former goal of minority group 
emancipation and participation, instead emphasising measures to reduce economic 
and social deprivation, to prevent discrimination and to improve the legal situation for 
minorities.
17
V. Comparative dimensions 
Immigration policy and integration
Immigration policies may have considerable consequences for the integration process. 
In looking at the countries, three groups emerge. The 'traditional countries of 
immigration’-the USA, Canada and Australia-have encouraged permanent migration 
and treated most legal immigrants as future citizens, permitting family re-union and 
granting secure residence status. Sweden, despite its very different historical 
background, has followed similar policies. The second group includes France, the 
Netherlands and Britain: immigrants from former colonies have received preferential 
treatment and have often been citizens at the time of entry. Permanent immigration 
has generally been accepted, and family reunion has been permitted. Immigrants 
from European countries have also generally been allowed family re-union, 
permanent residence and naturalisation. The third group consists of those countries 
which have tried to cling to rigid 'guestworker' models-above all Germany and 
Switzerland. Such countries have tried to prevent family re-union, have been 
reluctant to grant secure residence status, and have highly restrictive naturalisation 
rules.
However, these distinctions are neither absolute nor static. There has been a 
convergence of policies in European countries: the former colonial countries have 
become more restrictive, while the former guestworker countries have become less 
so. This has gone hand-in-hand with a new differentiation: the European Community 
countries granted a privileged status towards intra-community migrants in 1968, and 
further improvements with the formation of the unified market at the beginning of
1993. At the same time, entry and residence has become far more difficult for non- 
EC nationals, especially those from outside Europe. Moreover, the current emotional 
debate on the 'refugee influx' from the South and East has had a considerable impact. 
Increased racism, restriction of the rights of foreigners, demands for repatriation, and 
the emergence of a 'fortress Europa' mentality cannot but worsen the social and 
political position of existing minorities.
Immigration policies affect other areas of policy, such as labour market rights, 
security of residence and naturalisation. Moreover, ideologies of temporary 
migration create expectations within the receiving population. If a temporary sojourn 
turns into settlement, and the governments concerned refuse to admit this, then it is 
the immigrants who are blamed for the resulting problems. Immigration policies also 
help shape the consciousness of migrants themselves. In countries where they are
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granted secure residence status and civil rights, immigrants are able to build long­
term perspectives for themselves and their families. Where the myth of short-term 
sojourn is maintained, immigrants' perspectives are contradictory. Return to the 
country of origin may be difficult or impossible, but permanence in the immigration 
country is doubtful. Such immigrants cannot plan a future as part of the wider 
society. The result is isolation, separatism and emphasis on difference.
Labour market position
Trends towards labour market segmentation by ethnicity and gender were intrinsic in 
the type of labour migration practised until the mid-1970s: institutional 
discrimination-such as rules against job-changing, refusal to recognise overseas 
qualifications or exclusion from public employment-was a major cause of 
disadvantage. Informal discrimination-the unwillingness of employers to hire or 
promote migrant workers-also played a part. The situation has changed since the 
1970s: new migrants are much more diverse in education and occupational status. 
There is a trend towards polarisation: highly-skilled personnel are encouraged to 
enter, and are seen as an important factor in technology transfer. Low-skilled 
migrants are unwelcome as workers, but enter through family re-union, or as 
refugees. Their contribution to low-skilled occupations, casual work, the informal 
sector and small business is economically important, but is officially unrecognised.
When people come from poor to rich countries without local knowledge or networks, 
and lacking proficiency in the language, then their entry-point into the labour market 
is likely to be at a low level. The question is whether there is a fair chance of later 
upward mobility. The answer often depends on whether the state encourages the 
continuation of segmentation through its own practices, or whether it takes measures 
to give immigrants equal opportunities. Some countries have active policies to 
improve the labour market position of immigrants through language courses and 
vocational training, as well as equal opportunities and anti-discrimination legislation. 
These countries include Australia, Canada, Sweden and-to a lesser extent-Britain, 
France and the Netherlands. The USA also has equal opportunities, affirmative 
action and anti-discrimination legislation, but little in the way of language, education 
and training measures. This fits in with the laissez-faire model of social policy in the 
Reagan-Bush era.
The former guestworker countries-Germany and Switzerland-do offer some 
education and training measures for foreign workers and foreign youth. But at the 
same time there are restrictions on migrants' labour market rights. During the period
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of labour recruitment, work permits often bound foreign workers to specific jobs. 
Most workers in the two countries now have the right to mobility, but in many cases 
the rule of primacy for nationals still applies. This means that an employer cannot 
take on a foreign worker for a job if a national (or an EC citizen in the case of 
Germany) is available. Foreigners only have full equality in the labour market if they 
have long-term residence status-which is becoming increasingly common.
Migrant women
Migrant women's settlement experience remains distinct from that of men. In the 
early stages of labour migrations, there is a tendency to concentrate on the situation of 
male workers. However, in most immigration countries, a growing proportion of 
migrant workers have been women. Women who come through family reunion also 
often join the labour force. A high proportion of refugees are women, often heads of 
families with children (Morokvasic, 1984). Migrant women form the lowest segment 
in a labour market divided according to ethnicity and gender. They frequently 
provide unpaid labour in ethnic small businesses, giving a competitive edge that 
makes survival possible. In some sectors, notably the garment industry, complex 
patterns of division of labour on ethnic and gender lines have developed. Male ethnic 
entrepreneurs use female labour from their own groups, but are themselves dependent 
on large retail corporations (Waldinger et al. 1990; Phizacklea, 1990). As Phizacklea 
(1983: 5) points out, it is particularly easy to ascribe inferiority to women migrant 
workers, just because their primary roles in patriarchal societies are defined as wife 
and mother, dependent on a male breadwinner. They can therefore be paid lower 
wages and controlled more easily than men.
For many women (especially those from Muslim societies), migration to a highly- 
developed country may mean a radical break with previous forms of social behaviour. 
Their important position as producers in rural households, and their experience of 
community within the women's group may disappear, leading to social isolation and 
dependence on their husbands or male relatives. Male roles, by contrast, which are 
based on work and social interaction outside the household, are easier to maintain or 
re-establish. Cultural factors as well as child-care needs make it much harder for 
women to participate in language or other educational courses. Health, birth and 
social services are also issues of special concern to migrant women.
It is therefore necessary for government agencies to provide special services which 
are appropriate to the needs of migrant women of varying backgrounds. Such 
services exist to some extent in most countries of immigration, although provision
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tends to be more systematic and comprehensive where migrant women have been 
able to secure a consultative role through their own associations. Countries with 
multicultural policies have on the whole been more willing to recognise migrant 
women's needs, although even here there is still much to be done. Countries which 
have been reluctant to accept family reunion and permanent settlement have also been 
slow to recognise the needs of migrant women.
Migrant women play a particularly important part in the process of community 
formation. The significance of women's family and educational roles in reproducing 
and maintaining ethnic languages and cultures has been emphasised in many studies 
(see for instance Vasta, 1990). Family formation and the emergence of social 
networks in the immigration country helps to improve migrants' social and economic 
situation. These processes also provide the basis for community organisation and a 
measure of protection against racism. The formation of informal networks is an 
important part of the integration process (Boyd, 1989) and women play a special and 
decisive role in this.
Residential segregation and community formation
Residential segregation is to be found in all the immigration countries. It is extreme 
in the USA, where in certain areas there is almost complete separation between blacks 
and whites, and sometimes Asians and Hispanics too. In the other countries, 
immigrant groups are highly concentrated in certain city neighbourhoods, though they 
rarely form the majority of the population. Causes of residential segregation include 
low income and lack of local networks, discrimination, and the desire of immigrants 
to group together for cultural maintenance and for protection against racism. 
Institutional practises often encourage residential segregation. Many migrant workers 
were initially housed by employers or public authorities. This encouraged clustering, 
for when workers left their initial accommodation they tended to seek housing in the 
vicinity. Public housing allocation policies may also cause concentration.
Residential segregation is a contradictory phenomenon. Migrants may be socially 
disadvantaged by concentration in areas with poor housing and social amenities. But 
they frequently want to be together in order to provide mutual support, to rebuild 
family and neighbourhood networks and to maintain their languages and cultures. 
Ethnic neighbourhoods allow the establishment of small businesses and agencies 
which cater for immigrants’ needs, as well as the formation of associations of all 
kinds. Residential segregation is thus both a pre-condition for and a result of 
community formation.
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Some members of the majority population perceive residential segregation as a 
deliberate and threatening attempt to form 'ethnic enclaves' or 'ghettoes'. Racism is 
often a self-fulfilling prophecy: it justifies itself by portraying immigrants as alien 
groups, which will 'take over' the neighbourhood. By forcing immigrants to live 
together for protection, racism creates the 'ghettoes' it fears. One official reaction has 
been dispersal policies, designed to reduce ethnic concentrations. However, in the 
absence of the economic opportunities and political structures needed to overcome 
the powerful forces of marginalisation, dispersal policies are difficult to implement.
Social policy
As migrants moved into the inner cities and industrial towns, social conflicts with 
lower-income groups of the majority population developed. Immigrants were blamed 
for rising housing costs, declining housing quality and deteriorating social amenities. 
In response, a whole set of social policies developed in most immigration countries. 
In the early stages, social and community work measures were often initiated by non­
governmental organisations. These included church, trade union and other voluntary 
agencies. As time went on, migrant associations took an important role. With 
growing recognition of the realities of settlement, government agencies became 
increasingly involved, often working in cooperation with voluntary bodies. Where 
government has been slow to act, the role of non-governmental organisations 
remained important, and the character of their involvement has become increasingly 
political.
In France, for instance, urban renewal policies since the late 1960s have included 
measures to make public housing more accessible to immigrants. At the same time, 
the concept of the seuil de tolerance (threshold of tolerance) was introduced, 
according to which the immigrant presence should be limited to a maximum of 10 or 
15 per cent of residents in a housing estate or 25 per cent of students in a class 
(Verbunt, 1985). The implication was that immigrant concentrations presented a 
problem, and that dispersal was the pre-condition for assimilation. By the 1980s, the 
central social policy issue was the situation of ethnic minorities in the inner city areas 
and in the great public housing estates around the cities. These were rapidly turning 
into areas of persistent unemployment, social problems and conflicts between ethnic 
minorities and disadvantaged sections of the French population. Social policies 
focussed on urban youth (Lapeyronnie et al. 1990: 111). Weil concludes that the 
social policy measures of the 1980s have failed. They were designed to achieve 
integration into French society, but in fact they have 'linked all the problems of these 
towns and neighbourhoods to immigration: schooling, housing, employment or
22
national identity’. Thus social policy has encouraged concentration of minorities, 
which slows integration, encourages the formation of ethnic communities, and 
strengthens group religious and cultural affiliations (Weil, 1991: 176-9).
This is clearly a complex issue which would require careful analysis in each country. 
Special social policies for immigrants have often reinforced tendencies to 
segregation. For instance, the 'dual strategy' pursued in German education led to 
special classes for foreign children, causing both social isolation and poor educational 
performance. Housing allocation policies in Britain are intended to be non- 
discriminatory, yet they have sometimes led to the emergence of 'black' and 'white' 
housing estates. On the other hand, in Sweden, immigrant children have the right to 
instruction in mother-tongue classes. The official view is that these do not lead to 
separation, but encourage 'active bilingualism', which makes it easier for immigrant 
children to succeed at school and work (Lithman, 1987).
Again, it is possible to suggest a rough classification. Australia, Canada, Sweden and 
the Netherlands have pursued active social policies, linked to broader models of 
multiculturalism (or minorities policy, in the case of the Netherlands). The basic 
assumption has been that special social policies do not lead to separatism, but, on the 
contrary, form the precondition for successful integration. In Australia, there has 
been a policy of 'mainstreaming' migrant services-i.e. providing them through normal 
government agencies, rather than special bodies set up for migrants.
A second group of countries are those which reject special policies for migrants on 
principle. US authorities oppose special measures because they are seen as 
unnecessary government intervention. Nonetheless, equal opportunities, anti- 
discrimination and affirmative action measures deriving from civil rights laws have 
benefited immigrants. French governments have rejected special policies on the 
principle that immigrants should become citizens and that any special treatment 
would hinder that. Yet there have been a number of special social policies 
nonetheless. Britain has also developed a range of social policies in response to the 
urban crisis and youth riots, despite the ideological rejection of such measures by the 
Conservative leadership.
The third group of countries is, again, the former guestworker recruiters. In the early 
period of recruitment, the German Government delegated the provision of special 
social services to charitable organisations, linked to the churches and the labour 
movement. Although foreign workers were granted equal rights to work-related
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health and pension benefits, they were excluded from some welfare rights. 
Application for social security payments on the grounds of long-term unemployment 
or disability could lead to deportation. In Switzerland, there are few special measures 
for immigrants. Provision of support in emergency situations is left largely to 
voluntary efforts (Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1985:224).
Racism and resistance
Racist harassment and attacks have become major problems for ethnic minorities in 
all the countries of immigration. In Britain, racist violence organised by groups like 
the National Front became a problem in the 1970s. In London 2,179 racial incidents 
were reported to the police in 1987, including 270 cases of serious assault, 397 of 
minor assault, 483 of criminal damage, 47 of arson and 725 of abusive behaviour 
(Home Office, 1989). In France the extreme-right Front National has been able to 
mobilise resentments caused by unemployment and urban decline, and to crystallize 
them around the issues of immigration and cultural difference. German reunification 
was followed by an outburst of racist violence in 1991-92. The United States has a 
long history of white violence against Afro-Americans, and the Ku Klux Klan is still 
a powerful force. Asians, Arabs and other minorities are also frequent targets (ADL, 
1988). Even countries which pride themselves on their tolerance, like Canada, 
Sweden and the Netherlands, report a growing incidence of racist attacks. The 
European Parliament's Committee of Inquiry into Fascism and Racism in Europe 
found that 'immigrant communities... are daily subject to displays of distrust and 
hostility, to continuous discrimination... and in many cases, to racial violence, 
including murder' (European Parliament, 1985).
Racism is directed particularly against people of non-European background, such as 
Asian migrants in Australia, Canada or the USA; Afro-Caribbeans and Asians in 
Britain; North Africans and Turks in most Western European countries; and asylum 
seekers of non-European background just about everywhere. Phenotypical difference 
('race') seems to be the main criterion for hostility towards immigrants. A survey 
carried out on behalf of the EC Commission in all member countries in 1989 found 
strong feelings of distance and hostility towards non-Europeans, particularly Arabs, 
Africans and Asians. Overall, one European in three believed that there were too 
many people of another nationality or race in his or her country, with such feelings 
being most marked in Belgium and Germany (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1989).
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Islam is a particularly important marker of difference. The largest non-European 
groups are of Islamic background in France (North Africans) and Germany (Turks). 
There are also large Muslim groups in Britain (Bangladeshis and Pakistanis), the 
Netherlands and Belgium (Turks and Moroccans). European fear of Islam and 
hostility to Muslims has a tradition going back to the medieval crusades. In recent 
years, anxiety about fundamentalism and loss of modernity and secularity have 
played a major role. But it could be argued that such fears are based on racist 
ideologies rather than social realities. The strengthening of Muslim affiliations is 
often a protective reaction of discriminated groups, so that fundamentalism is 
something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, stereotypes of Islam are usually 
undifferentiated and inaccurate, and ignore the great diversity of religious values and 
behavioural forms in various countries of origin.
Racist campaigns, harassment and violence can be a major constraint to integration. 
One form of migrant resistance to racism is residential clustering and ethnic 
community formation. Such communities develop their own social political and 
religious institutions, which can increase isolation from the mainstream of society. 
Reactions of members of ethnic minorities to racism vary widely. There is often a 
gulf between the experiences of the migrant generation and those of their children, 
who have grown up and gone to school in the new country. Ethnic minority youth 
become aware of the contradiction between the prevailing ideologies of equal 
opportunity and the reality of discrimination and racism in their daily lives. This can 
lead to emergence of counter cultures and political radicalisation.
In turn, ethnic minority youth are perceived by those in power as a ’social time-bomb' 
or a threat to public order, which has to be contained through social control 
institutions such as the police, schools and welfare bureaucracies. The youth 
disturbances which took place in many European cities in the 1980s epitomise such 
conflicts. The USA also has experienced violent protests by minorities. The Los 
Angeles riots of May 1992 were provoked by police brutality towards a black 
motorist, which went unpunished by the courts. Aggression was directed not only 
against whites, but also Koreans and Cubans, who have taken on middleman minority 
roles in areas where big white-owned companies fear to trade.
VI. Citizenship
The analysis so far has shown important differences in models of migrant integration, 
not only between 'traditional immigration countries' and 'recent labour-importers' but
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also within each group. The variations are linked to fundamental difference in 
concepts of the nation-state and citizenship. Some countries make it very difficult for 
immigrants to become citizens, others grant citizenship but only at the price of 
cultural assimilation, while a third group makes it possible for immigrants to become 
citizens while maintaining distinct cultural identities. This corresponds closely with 
other policies: countries which are unwilling to grant citizenship often deny the 
reality of settlement, restrict immigrant rights and follow exclusionary social policies. 
Countries with assimilationist citizenship policies accept permanent settlement, but 
tend to reject special social and cultural policies for immigrants. Countries which 
grant citizenship and accept cultural pluralism generally also see the need for special 
social policies for immigrants.
Table 2: Naturalisations in selected countries
Country Date of Foreign resident Number of Naturalisations 
figures population naturalisations per thousand 
thousands foreign resident 
______________________________________________________ population
Australia 1988 1 427 81218 56.9
Belgium 1989 881 1 878 2.1
Canada 1989 n.a. 87 476 n.a
France 1989 3 752 49 330 13.1
Germany 1988 4 489 16 660 3.7
Britain 1988 2 550 64 600 25.3
Netherlands 1990 642 12 700 19.8
Sweden 1989 456 17 552 38.5
Switzerland 1989 1040 10 342 9.9
USA 1989 n.a. 233 777 n.a.
Notes: n.a. = not available. The foreign resident population figure for Australia for 1988 is an 
estimate, made by taking the foreign resident figure from the 1986 Census, and adding a factor 
proportionate to the growth in overall overseas-born population from 1986 to 1988. The foreign 
resident population figure for France is for 1985, although the naturalisation figure is for 1989. The 
foreign resident population for Great Britain is for 1989. The comparison merely has indicative value, 
as definitions and categories vary from country to country.
Sources: OECD SOPEMI, 1991; Muus, 1991; Australian Census, 1986.
Naturalisation
Table 2 shows that the rank order of countries according to the number of 
naturalisations per thousand of foreign resident population is: Australia, Sweden, 
Britain, Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium. It has not been 
possible to calculate rates for the USA and Canada due to lack of data on the foreign
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resident population. However, the large absolute numbers of naturalisations makes it 
reasonable to assume rates of naturalisations somewhere between Australia's and 
Sweden's.
Even in countries where naturalisation is easy to obtain, some immigrants are 
unwilling to give up their original citizenship. This may be due to a refusal to cut 
symbolic links with the place of birth, but it can also be due to practical reasons 
connected with military service or land ownership rules in the area of origin. The 
best solution in such cases is the granting of dual citizenship. Dual citizenship is 
generally rejected by governments because of fears of 'divided loyalties', yet it is 
becoming increasingly common, especially for the children of mixed marriages. 
Another solution is to create special residence categories which confer some of the 
rights of citizenship (e.g. 'establishment permits' in Switzerland or 'residence 
entitlements' in Germany). Local voting rights for foreign residents is also a form of 
'quasi-citizenship'. Such approaches, however, are unsatisfactory, for they create new 
divisions between full citizens, quasi-citizens and foreigners.
Status of the the second generation
In countries which apply the principle of ius sanguinis (that is citizenship by descent 
from parents who are citizens) such as Germany and Switzerland, children who are 
bom and grow up in the country are denied not only security of residence, but also a 
clear national identity. They are formally citizens of a country they may have never 
seen, and can even be deported there in certain circumstances. In countries with ius 
soli (that is, citizenship through birth on the territory) such as Australia, Canada, the 
USA and Britain, second generation settlers still generally have multiple cultural 
identities, but they have a secure legal basis on which to make decisions about their 
life perspectives. Intermediate forms, such as choice of citizenship at the age of 18 
(as in France or Sweden) are reasonably satisfactory. Again dual citizenship seems 
the best solution, as it would avoid decisions which can be extremely difficult for 
many individuals.
Linguistic and cultural rights
Maintenance of language and culture is seen as a need and a right by most immigrant 
groups. Many ethnic associations are concerned with language and culture: they 
teach the mother-tongue to the second generation, organise festivals and carry out 
rituals. Language and culture serve not only as means of communication, but take on 
a symbolic meaning which is central to ethnic group cohesion. In most cases, 
language maintenance applies in the first two to three generations, after which there is
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a rapid decline. The significance of cultural symbols and rituals may last much 
longer.
Migrant languages and cultures become symbols of otherness and markers for 
discrimination. Many people regard cultural difference as a threat to a supposed 
cultural homogeneity and to national identity. This is rationalised with the assertion 
that the official language is essential for economic success, and that migrant cultures 
are inadequate for a modem secular society. The alternative view is that migrant 
communities need their own languages and cultures to develop identity and self­
esteem. Cultural maintenance helps create a secure basis which assists group 
integration into the wider society, while bi-lingualism brings benefits in learning and 
intellectual development.
Policies and attitudes on cultural and linguistic maintenance vary considerably. Some 
countries have histories of multilingualism. Canada's policy of bilingualism is based 
on two 'official languages', English and French. Multicultural policies have led to 
limited recognition of and support for immigrant languages, but they have hardly 
penetrated into mainstream contexts, such as broadcasting. Switzerland has a 
multilingual policy for its founding languages, but does not recognise immigrant 
languages. Australia and Sweden both accept the principle of linguistic and cultural 
maintenance. They provide interpreting and translating services and mother-tongue 
classes, as well as support for ethnic community cultural organisations. Australia has 
a 'national policy on languages', concerned with both community languages and 
languages of economic significance. Multicultural radio and television are funded by 
the government. Canada, Sweden and Australia all have multicultural education 
policies.
In the USA, monolingualism is being eroded by the growth of the Hispanic 
community. This has led to a backlash in the form of 'the US English movement' 
which has called for a constitutional amendment to declare English the official 
language. Despite official rejection of linguistic pluralism, it has proved essential to 
establish a range of multi-lingual services. Monolingualism is also the basic principle 
in France, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands. Nonetheless all these countries 
have been forced to introduce language services to take account of migrant needs in 
communicating with courts, bureaucracies and health services. The multilingual 
character of inner-city school-classes has led to special measures for immigrant 
children, and to a gradual shift towards multicultural education policies.
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VII. Conclusions
The cross-national comparison of migrant integration can be summed up by saying 
that in all countries there are major groups which do not quickly become integrated 
into mainstream society. Ethnic group formation takes place everywhere, but under 
conditions which vary considerably. This leads to different outcomes: in some 
countries ethnic groups become marginalised and excluded minorities, in others they 
take the form of ethnic communities which are accepted as part of a pluralist society.
Exclusion is most severe in the former 'guestworker' countries like Germany and 
Switzerland. Multicultural models are to be found in countries with explicit policies 
of permanent settlement and pluralism: above all Australia, Canada and Sweden. The 
USA, as a permanent settlement country without multicultural policies, comes close 
to the pluralist model, but without its explicit political goals. The Netherlands also 
comes close to the multicultural model, though in a weaker form. Between the 
extremes of exclusion or multiculturalism are countries like France and Britain, which 
recognise the reality of permanent settlement, but are unwilling to accept pluralism as 
a long-term perspective. However, there are important differences between France 
and Britain, particularly with regard to the role of the state in managing cultural 
difference. France continues to emphasise political integration through citizenship as 
the key to integration, while some British policies do tacitly acknowledge the need for 
special social and cultural policies for minorities.
The reality in each country is much more complex and contradictory than our brief 
account can show. Nonetheless some general conclusions emerge. The first is that 
policies of temporary migrant labour recruitment are almost certain to lead to 
permanent settlement and formation of ethnic groups. No state which bases its 
policies on the rule of law and human rights can prevent this development. Countries 
which have recently begun to make use of migrant labour, both in Southern Europe 
and in East and Southeast Asia would do well to reflect on this.
The second conclusion is that the character of the ethnic groups will, to a large 
measure, be determined by what the state does in the early stages of migration. 
Policies which try to deny the reality of immigration by tacitly tolerating large-scale 
illegal movements lead to social marginalisation, minority formation and racism. 
Policies which try to maintain a permanent division between foreigners and nationals, 
by denying rights to the former and preventing them from acquiring citizenship, also 
lead to a divided society. The best chance for successful settlement and peaceful
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interaction between ethnic groups lies in policies which accept permanent settlement 
and family reunion, and make it easy for immigrants to become citizens.
A third conclusion is that ethnic groups arising from immigration need their own 
associations and social networks, as well as their own languages and cultures. 
Policies which deny legitimacy to these lead to isolation and separatism. Cultural 
rights should therefore be recognised as part of citizenship, along with the more 
customary civil, political and social rights.
A fourth conclusion is that successful integration requires active policies from the 
state. These include settlement services, such as initial accommodation, help in 
finding work and language courses. Social policies are also needed to provide for the 
special needs of migrants over long periods: measures in education, health and social 
services, provision of interpreter and translation facilities, and the provision of aged- 
care for people of migrant background. Migrant women are often particularly 
disadvantaged and need special services and amenities. The guiding principle of 
social policy should be that its long-run aim is to not provide separate systems of 
service provision, but rather to change mainstream systems to respond to the needs of 
a culturally diverse population. Finally, the state needs to introduce legislation to 
help remove barriers which prevent full participation of migrants in society. This 
includes anti-discrimination and equal opportunities measures, as well as laws to 
combat racist violence and vilification. Special agencies are needed to monitor the 
implementation of such measures.
All these conclusions share the general implication that policies of multiculturalism 
offer the best perspective for successful migrant integration. European observers 
have often asserted that the experience of the 'traditional immigration countries' has 
little relevance for them, but this claim appears increasingly dubious. European 
labour importing countries have become countries of permanent settlement, whatever 
their original intentions. They therefore need to look to the models expressly 
developed to integrate permanent settlers, rather than cling to myths of temporariness. 
Moreover, the Swedish case shows that a multicultural model can be implemented in 
a European country with monocultural traditions.
The same applies to the newer countries of immigration, such as Italy, Greece, Spain, 
Japan and some of the fast-growing Southeast Asian countries. Some governments 
have tended to take a laissez-faire approach, tolerating entries of undocumented 
workers, because employers need the labour. Others have set up 'guestworker'
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systems for temporary labour recruitment. Since there has been no official 
expectation of settlement, social policies and legal frameworks to support integration 
have been largely absent. The result has been growing marginalisation of migrants, 
to the point where in some countries shanty-towns are visible around big cities and 
beggars are common. This feeds into extreme-right propaganda, and leads to hostility 
towards migrants. The parallels with earlier developments in countries like France 
and Germany are obvious.
However, it would be wrong to think that multicultural models offer easy answers for 
Western Europe, or for new countries of immigration. The growth of racist violence 
and the success of extreme-right mobilisation around issues of immigration and 
cultural difference make it very hard for governments to move towards improvements 
in migrants' rights or to accept the perspective of cultural pluralism. The central 
problem is the fear caused by the growing pressure for migration from poor areas 
with growing populations to rich areas with stagnant populations. It is becoming 
clear that successful integration of existing migrants depends on the development of 
international policies which will help narrow the North-South and East-West gaps, 
and thus reduce the need for migration. This is an issue that goes beyond the scope of 
the present paper.
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